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WRITING IT RIGHT

REFERENCES TO
TELEVISION SHOWS IN
JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND
WRITTEN ADVOCACY
(PART I)
Douglas E. Abrams1
“Think of the poor judge who
is reading . . . hundreds and
hundreds of these briefs,” says
Chief Justice John G. Roberts,
Jr. “Liven up their life
just a little bit . . . with
something interesting.”2
In 1942, shortly before he
ascended to the Supreme
Court bench, D.C. Circuit
Judge Wiley B. Rutledge
similarly advised
advocates that “[i]t helps
to break the monotony
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of the printed legal page to add
a bit of life now and then.”3
Justice Antonin Scalia urged brief writers to “[m]ake it
interesting.”4 “I don’t think the law has to be dull.” “Legal briefs
are necessarily illed with abstract concepts that are diicult
to explain,” Justice Scalia continued.5 “Nothing clariies their
meaning as well as examples” that “cause the serious legal points
you’re making to be more vivid, more lively, and hence more
memorable.”6
In the Journal of the Missouri Bar, I have written about how
lawyers can “liven up” their advocacy, and add “a bit of life now
and then,” with examples drawn from cultural markers that help
deine American life. Lawyers would follow the lead of federal
and state judges, who often spice their opinions with these
markers.

My previous Journal articles have concerned examples drawn
from baseball, football, and other prominent sports whose basic
rules, strategies, and terminology are generally well-known to
lawyers and judges.7 This article concerns examples drawn from
well-known television shows.
In written opinions that decide cases with no claims or
defenses concerning television programming or the television
industry, judges often help explain substantive or
procedural points with references to themes and
ictional characters from well-known television
dramas, situation comedies (“sitcoms”), and even
reality shows. In civil and criminal cases, the
courts’ careful use of television references invites
advocates to use such references carefully in their
written submissions.
Some judges use references to television shows
that regularly feature lawyers and law enforcement;
other judges discuss shows that mention the law
rarely or not at all. Some of the shows (such as
Perry Mason and Dragnet) feature characters and
themes that appeared earlier in novels or on radio,
Abrams but recollections of today’s judges and lawyers
likely stem primarily from the hit television shows,
even years after the cited shows left the air.
This is a two-part article. This Part I opens with brief
discussion of television’s profound decades-old inluence on
American culture, a sturdy foundation for judges’ conidence
that readers will connect with references to popular shows that
dominated the airwaves as today’s generation was growing up.
This Part then surveys the array of television dramas that appear
in federal and state judicial opinions.
In the Journal’s next issue, Part II will survey the array of
sitcoms and reality shows that appear in judicial opinions.
Part II will conclude by discussing why advocates should feel
comfortable following the courts’ lead by carefully referencing
television shows to help sharpen substantive and procedural
arguments in the ilings they submit.
Television’s Inluence on American Culture
“In many ways over the past half-century, the history of
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television has become the history of America,” says historian
Steven D. Stark.8 Television programming, he explains, “has
been inluential – superseding school, and sometimes even
the family, as the major inluence on our social and moral
development. It is fair to say that there have been two eras in
America: Before Television (BT) and After Television (AT).”9
Contemporary writers and readers of briefs and judicial opinions
grew up in the latter era, marked by television’s dominance in
American homes from coast to coast.
Transforming American Life
With television still in its infancy, only nine percent of U.S.
households owned at least one set in 1950. Two historians say,
however, that the new medium was already “inding its place
in the American living room (and bedroom and dining room
and kitchen and den and basement and hospital ward and bus
station).”10
From 1954 to 1956, about 10,000 U.S. households a day were
installing a television set for the irst time.11 By 1955, 13 percent
of households owned two or more sets and some owned as many
as six.12 The percentages of TV ownership grew each year,
reaching 64.5 percent of American households in 1955 and 85.9
percent in 1959.13 By the end of the 1950s, households with
television sets watched an average of ive hours and two minutes
of programming daily.14
“Nothing,” wrote journalist David Halberstam, “changed the
culture and the habits of Americans more than the coming of
television.”15 Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Daniel J. Boorstin
said that the medium “opened another world [that] would
transform American life more radically than any other modern
invention except the automobile. . . . Just as the printing press
ive centuries before had begun to democratize learning, now the
television set would democratize experience.”16
Television, writes legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman,
became one of the “powerful forces unifying the economy.”17
Halberstam called television a “true national phenomenon”
whose power “revolutionized American society” by “wir[ing] the
entire country together visually.”18
Television’s growing presence in American homes, writes
presidential historian Jon Meacham, gave Sen. Joseph
McCarthy “nearly unlimited possibilities to dominate the public
consciousness” during his few years of national tumult in the
irst half of the 1950s.19 Meacham adds that the possibility of
public domination led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to avoid
overexposure: “I can think of nothing more boring, for the
American public,” said the president, “than to have to sit in their
living rooms for a whole half hour looking at my face on their
television screens.”20
“The First Television Generation”
In 1961, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and historian
Theodore H. White observed that in the prior decade, television
had “exploded to a dimension in shaping the American mind
that rival[ed] that of America’s schools and churches.”21
The nation was raising what National Humanities Medalwinning writer William Manchester called “the irst television
generation.”22 Historians report that television had become
“[o]ne of the most powerful of all postwar entertainments,”23
indeed “an American habit and a virtual necessity,”24 and an
26

“electronic prodigy endowed with the capacity to inluence an
entire nation.”25
In 1961, Federal Communications Commission chairman
Newton N. Minow recognized television’s emerging cultural force
when he sharply criticized the medium as a “vast wasteland,”
marked by “a procession of game shows, formula comedies
about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem,
violence, sadism, murder, western bad men, western good men,
private eyes, gangsters, more violence, and cartoons.”26
“When television is good, nothing — not the theater, not
the magazines or newspapers — nothing is better,” Minow
concluded, “[b]ut when television is bad, nothing is worse.”27
Television took a sharp turn toward the good on September
2, 1963, when the three major networks expanded their nightly
newscasts from 15 minutes to half an hour. Describing this new
sinew that would help bind the nation together, White called the
expanded coverage “as signiicant in American history as the
Golden Spike that linked the Union Paciic and Central Paciic
to give America is irst continental railway in 1869.”28
To paraphrase Minow, television emerged as an indispensable
force for good when the networks steadied the wounded
nation in the four fateful days immediately after President
John F. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963.
Journalist White reported that most Americans (Manchester’s
“irst television generation”) watched virtually non-stop. The
networks responded with tasteful, informative around-theclock broadcasting uninterrupted by commercial advertising.
Television, said White, “stabilized a nation in emotional shock
and on the edge of hysteria.”29
With its demonstrated capacity to command a national
audience by the 1960s, television remained on the cutting edge
of social change. “The civil rights revolution in the South,” write
journalists Robert J. Donovan and Ray Scherer, “began when
a man and the eye of the television ilm camera came together,
giving the camera a focal point for events breaking from state to
state, and the man, Martin Luther King, Jr., high exposure on
television sets from coast to coast.”30
“A Television Nation”
In 1969, White reported that television had emerged as “the
greatest of all the new media of American culture,” a common
denominator that “fused all America into one audience” and
“held all America captive.”31 With audiences of 40 or 50 million
viewers from coast to coast, White added, the networks’ nightly
newscasts alone had become “for the masses, the mirror of the
world.”32
Television’s inluence on American culture continued growing.
The percentages of U.S. households owning at least one TV
set rose from 87.1 percent in 1960 to 95.0 percent in 1969, and
from 95.2 percent in 1970 to 98.0 percent in 1978.33 The average
amount of household time spent daily watching television rose
from ive hours and six minutes in 1960, to ive hours and 48
minutes in 1969.34 By 1978, the average daily amount stood at
six hours and ten minutes,35 and “America’s infatuation with
television”36 led adults to spend about 28 percent of their leisure
time watching the set.37 Americans, said journalist Halberstam,
now had television “connecting them to the world,” and the
United States had become “a television nation.”38
By 2007, the average household’s daily dose of television had
mobar.org

risen to more than eight hours.39 The average child graduates
from high school after spending 13,000 hours in school and
25,000 hours in front of the TV set.40 In the 2017-2018 season,
96.5 percent of U.S. homes owned a television, more homes than
have indoor plumbing.41
By the 1980s, Americans – including judges and advocates –
had either grown up during what Manchester called the “Age
of Television,”42 or had become increasingly familiar with TV
programming throughout adulthood. In 1989, one ilm critic
wrote that “[g]iven the sheer breadth of its appeal, television
tends to address – and help create – widely held beliefs that
permeate the culture.”43
Television Dramas
“Writing,” said Sir Ernest Gowers, “is an instrument for
conveying ideas from one mind to another; the writer’s job is to
make his reader apprehend his meaning readily and precisely.”44
Federal and state judges sometimes convey ideas with careful
references to television dramas, situation comedies, and reality
shows. We turn here to dramas, before turning to the other two
genres in Part II of this article next time.
Perry Mason
“Ever since the days of Perry Mason, viewers have always
locked to shows about lawyers.”45 Prominent among the “lock”
are lawyers themselves, including Justice Sonia Sotomayor who,
during her 2009 Senate conirmation hearings for a Supreme
Court appointment, cited Perry Mason as the childhood inluence
that led her to pursue a career in law.46
Perry Mason has been called “America’s lawyer,”47 and his
dramatic television series remains the lawyers show discussed
most often in judicial opinions.48 To Supreme Court judges and
other Americans, the name “Perry Mason” remains almost
synonymous with the term “lawyer.”49 Indeed, in a National Law
Journal poll conducted in 1993 (nearly 30 years after the show
left prime time for syndication), the ictional Mason inished
second to F. Lee Bailey as the nation’s most admired lawyer.50
Bailey might not have won the honor after his controversial role
as a defense counsel in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial shortly
afterwards. Nor would Bailey’s lofty stature have survived his
2001 disbarment in Florida,51 and the later unwillingness of
Maine bar authorities to license him.52
Defense counsel Perry Mason’s character originated in Erle
Stanley Gardner’s detective novels and had a successful run in
four movies and on radio before Raymond Burr played the title
role in 271 television episodes that aired from 1957 to 1966.53
Citing Perry Mason’s enduring image as the “lawless”54 lawyer
who never lost a case,55 most judicial decisions discussing the
show presume readers’ understanding, without explanation in
text or footnote. Only a few decisions provide brief explanations
to orient readers who might be too young to recall the television
series, or who might not follow today’s re-runs.56
Typical in presuming readers’ understanding is Spotted Cat,
LLC v. Bass, which disqualiied the plaintif’s counsel in a damage
action on the ground that counsel would be a necessary trial
witness.57 The federal district court rejected the plaintif’s
speculation that the defendant “may, upon taking the oath at
trial, suddenly decide to fully agree with Plaintif’s version of
events.”58 The court found the speculation remote because it
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depended on “the occurrence of a ‘Perry Mason’ moment in the
courtroom. . . . [I]n the Court’s experience, such moments are
usually conined to ictional courtrooms.”59
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit observed that
defense counsel Mason “possessed an uncanny aptitude for
exonerating clients by casting blame elsewhere.”60 Representing
clients whose guilt appeared likely for much of the hour, he
would defeat prosecutor Hamilton Burger with dogged personal
investigation, usually climaxed by Mason’s dramatic cross
examination that led a key witness or a spectator to break down
on the stand or elsewhere in the courtroom, often with a tearful
confession.61 Hence, the “Perry Mason moment.”
Courts citing Perry Mason recognize that during crossexamination in actual criminal and civil proceedings, witnesses
do sometimes break down with key concessions, unanticipated
information, or tearful confessions.62 But courts also cite Perry
Mason for the proposition that these climaxes remain “very
rare”63 because well prepared counsel normally anticipate the
course of the trial in the relatively few cases that do not end with
pretrial settlement or plea bargain, and because contemporary
procedure emphasizes pretrial discovery and favors conferences
with the court outside the jury’s presence or earshot when
surprise does surface.64 Courts frequently call attention to
Perry Mason defenses65 and Perry Mason moments,66 but also
recognize (according to the Minnesota Court of Appeals) that
such twists and turns “tend only to happen on late night TV if
your station carries reruns.”67
continued on page 50.
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ETHICS

REFERRALS: WHAT YOU
NEED TO STAY OUT OF
ETHICAL TROUBLE
Nancy Ripperger1
Referral marketing can be a very
desirable source of new business
for an attorney. The American
Bar Association (“ABA”) has noted

Fee Sharing with Non-Attorneys Is Prohibited By Rule
4-5.4(a)
An attorney should not agree to split or share a fee with a nonattorney. Rule 4-5.4(a) prohibits the sharing of fees with nonlawyers except in certain limited circumstances. This prohibition
includes agreements with non-attorneys to solicit clients in return
for a share of the fee.

that encouraging referrals in a
systematic and structured way
is the most cost-effective and
productive marketing that an
attorney can do.2
Referring out a matter also can be beneicial to an attorney
if a matter is outside of the referring attorney’s usual practice
area or outside the referring attorney’s geographical location.
The referring attorney may be able to share in the fees but does
not have to learn a new area of law, obtain licensure in another
jurisdiction. or travel long distances to handle the matter.
While referrals can be beneicial to both the referring and
receiving attorney, referrals are not without ethical risks. Before
making or accepting a referral, an attorney should ensure that
the referral complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
This article will set out some of the common ethical issues
related to referrals.
Kickbacks, Along With Nominal Nonmonetary Gifts,
Are Prohibited
There is much written about what an attorney can do to
develop and maintain a referral network to increase business.
One of the most common suggestions for an attorney to keep
and increase a referral network is for the attorney to show his or
her appreciation to the referring client, third party, or attorney.
Sending a thank you note to any of the above referring sources
is ethically acceptable. However, sending a monetary fee or gift
to an attorney, client or third party for a referral is prohibited
by Supreme Court Rule 4-7.2(c). It provides that a lawyer shall
not give anything of value to a person for recommending the
lawyer’s services. 3 It does not contain an exception for nominal,
nonmonetary gifts.4 Thus, an attorney is prohibited from giving
the referral source a “substantial monetary kickback” and from
more innocuous activities such as taking the referral source to
dinner or sending the referral source a nice bottle of wine to
show his or her appreciation for the referral.
28

Fee Sharing Between Attorneys Requires Strict
Compliance with Rule 4-1.5(e)
Despite the limitations of Rule 4-7.2 (c), an attorney can split
or share fees with another attorney if certain conditions are met.
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4-1.5(e) addresses the division of
fees between attorneys who are not from the same irm. The irst
requirement of Rule 4-1.5(e) is that both attorneys must retain
some level of responsibility for the representation. The courts are
very strict in applying this requirement. Failing to comply with
the responsibility requirement can subject an attorney to both
disciplinary action and the loss of fees.
For example, in Risjord v. Lewis,5 an attorney who had handled
a personal injury action brought a declaratory action to determine whether the referring attorney was entitled to any of the attorney fees. The fee agreement with the client provided that the
referring attorney was entitled to 40 percent of the attorney fees.
The Court struck down the fee agreement, noting that “merely
recommending another lawyer or referring a case to another
lawyer and failing to do anything further” does not entitle the
referring attorney to any portion of the fees.6
Rule 4-1.5(e) sets forth two situations whereby the referring
attorney retains the requisite level of responsibility needed to
share in the fees. The irst situation is where the referring attorney continues to provide legal services to the client along with
the other attorney. In other words, the referring attorney acts as
co-counsel in the matter. In this situation, the division of the fees
must be proportional to the services performed by each attorney. Rule 4-1.5 (e)(1). Courts generally look to see whether the
division of fees bears a reasonable correlation to the amount or
value of the services rendered by the attorney. Courts will strike
down a fee division if there is a glaring imbalance between a
lawyer’s share of the fee and the value of his or her services.7 For
example, in Eng v. Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho,8 the referring
attorney was seeking one-third of the attorney fees. The Court
noted that passing on updates to the client from the trial attorney
and providing counseling about the trial process did not constitute one-third of the work.
In the second situation, the referring attorney generally is not
required to perform any actual work on the referred matter.9
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However, the referring attorney must assume “joint responsibility” for the representation. Comment 7 to Rule 4-1.5 states
“joint responsibility entails both inancial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a
partnership.” Missouri courts have not deined what “inancial
responsibility” or “ethical responsibility” means. However, courts
from other jurisdictions have deined “inancial responsibility”
to mean that the referring attorney would be jointly liable in a
malpractice suit. See Kummerer v. Marshall.10 Because of the joint
inancial liability imposed by Rule 4-1.5(e), the referring attorney
may want to ascertain whether the receiving attorney has malpractice insurance and whether the referring attorney’s malpractice insurance policy covers malpractice of co-counsel.
“Ethical responsibility” is somewhat more diicult to ascertain
as no court has opined on its meaning. In addition, Missouri has
not addressed the issue via a formal or informal ethics opinion.
However, the Wisconsin State Bar Professional Ethics Committee
Formal Ethics Opinion EF-10-02 (“the Opinion”) is instructive.11
The Opinion provides clear cut and practical advice on the issue
of “ethical responsibility.” It emphasizes that “the duty of joint
responsibility imports a serious responsibility as a lawyer and is
not a mere hand of of the case to another lawyer to handle in
his or her own fettered discretion.”
The Opinion provides that while the referring attorney need
not be involved in the day-to-day handling of the case, the referring attorney must periodically review the status of the matter
and maintain enough contact to ascertain whether the attorney
handling the matter is abiding by the Rules of Professional
Conduct. It also sets forth that the referring attorney has a duty
to ensure the attorney who receives the referral is competent
to handle the matter.12 These requirements make clear that the
referring attorney needs to be very careful in the selection of the
attorney to handle the matter and should not base his or her selection merely upon which attorney ofers the referring attorney
the best fee sharing deal.
The Opinion also explains that while the referring attorney
need not have the same resources or expertise as the receiving
attorney, the referring attorney must be willing, and able, to
step in if the receiving attorney cannot complete the matter. For
example, per the Opinion, the referring attorney must step in
if the receiving attorney becomes unable to act due to illness.
The referring attorney must take whatever action is necessary
to protect the client’s interests. This could mean entering an appearance and requesting a continuance or helping the client to
ind new counsel.
Besides requiring the referring attorney to share some level
of responsibility in the case, Rule 4-1.5(e) requires that the fees
charged be reasonable. In this context, “reasonable” means that
the total fee should not be signiicantly greater than it would
have been if there had been no association with another attorney.13 Thus, it is important that the attorneys do not “double
charge” for doing the same work.
Finally, and very importantly, Rule 4-1.5(e) provides that the
client must agree to the association between the two attorneys
and the agreement must be “conirmed in writing.14 “Conirmed
in writing” means either that the client consents to the referral
in writing or that the lawyer promptly sends a writing to the
client conirming the client’s oral informed consent to the referral. Rule 4-1.0(b). While the client must consent to the association, the attorneys are not required to disclose to the client what

share of the fees each attorney will receive. Comment 7 to Rule
4-1.5(e).15 However, to avoid fee disputes between the attorneys
it is recommended that the attorneys have a written agreement
which sets out both parties’ responsibilities in the matter and the
fee division between the attorneys.
The rule is silent as to which lawyer must obtain the written
consent from the client. Missouri courts have not addressed
the issue but some courts in other jurisdictions have suggested
that the responsibility falls on both the referring and receiving
attorney. See Kentucky Bar Association v. Chesley.16 Thus, to avoid any
potential problem concerning this issue, it is best for both attorneys to obtain the consent
.
Conclusion
In summary, referrals can be beneicial to an attorney whether
the attorney is making the referral or receiving the referral.
However, before an attorney makes a referral or encourages others to make referrals to the attorney, an attorney should review
Missouri Supreme Court Rules 4-1.5(e), 4-5.4(a), and 4-7.2(c)
and then ensure that his or her conduct is in accordance with the
rules.
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SUPREME COURT RULE CHANGES
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in an order dated December
4, 2018, repealed subdivision 8.09, entitled “Admission by
Transferred Uniform Bar Examination Score,” of Rule 8
(Admission to the Bar), and in lieu thereof adopted a new
subdivision 8.09, entitled “Admission by Transferred Uniform
Bar Examination Score.”
This order becomes efective January 1, 2019.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.
In an order dated December 3, 2018, the Supreme Court
of Missouri repealed subdivision 74.11(a), entitled
“Acknowledgement of Satisfaction,” of Rule 74 (Judgments,
Orders and Proceedings Thereon), and adopted a new
subdivision 74.11(a), entitled “Acknowledgement of Satisfaction.”
This order becomes efective July 1, 2019.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in an order dated December
3, 2018, adopted and approved for distribution forms for motion
to modify child support and related instructions prepared by that
Court’s Committee on Access to Family Courts and reviewed by
the State Judicial Records Committee and the Supreme Court.
The forms are efective July 1, 2019 and may be used
prior thereto. These forms supersede any similar forms and
instructions previously approved by the Supreme Court of
Missouri.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.
In an order dated December 18, 2018, the Supreme Court
of Missouri corrected an order of June 29, 2018, when it
repealed and adopted provisions of Rule 37, entitled “Statutory
and Ordinance Violations and Violation Bureaus,” including
repeal of subdivision 37.43 (Ordinance Violation – Summons
or Arrest Warrant – When Issued – Failure to Appear);
subdivision 37.435 (Statement of Probable Cause); subdivision
(f) of subdivision 37.64 (Sentence and Judgment); subdivision
37.65 (Imposition and Payment of Fines, Fees, and Costs, and
Contempt Proceedings); and the heading title and subdivision
37.66 (Sentence of Imprisonment – Transcript to Corrections
Oicial) and in lieu thereof adopted a new subdivision 37.43
(Ordinance Violation – Summons or Arrest Warrant – When
Issued – Failure to Appear); a new subdivision 37.435 (Statement
of Probable Cause); a new subdivision (f) of subdivision 37.64
(Sentence and Judgment); a new subdivision 37.65 (Imposition
and Payment of Fines, Fees, and Costs, and Contempt
Proceedings); and a new heading title and new subdivision 37.66
(Sentence of Incarceration – Transcript to Corrections Oicial).
This order became efective January 1, 2019.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.
30

The Supreme Court of Missouri, in an order dated December
18, 2018, repealed subdivision 21.03 (Misdemeanors – Summons
or Warrant of Arrest – When Issued); subdivision 21.04
(Misdemeanors – Statement of Probable Cause – Contents);
subdivision 21.05 (Misdemeanor – Summons – Contents); the
heading title and subdivision 21.06 (Misdemeanors – Warrant
of Arrest – Contents); the heading title and subdivision 21.09
(Misdemeanors – Appearance Under Warrant Before Judge);
and the heading title and subdivision 21.10 (Misdemeanors
– Initial Proceedings Before Judge), of Rule 21, entitled
“Procedure Applicable to Misdemeanors Only,” and lieu thereof
adopted a new subdivision 21.03 (Misdemeanors – Summons
or Warrant of Arrest – When Issued); a new subdivision 21.04
(Misdemeanors – Statement of Probable Cause – Contents); a
new subdivision 21.05 (Misdemeanor – Summons – Contents);
a new heading title and a new subdivision 21.06 (Misdemeanors
– Warrant for Arrest – Contents); a new heading title and a new
subdivision 21.09 (Misdemeanors – Appearance Under Warrant
Before the Court); and a new heading title and a new subdivision
21.10 (Misdemeanors – Initial Appearance Before the Court).
In the same order, the Court repealed subdivision 22.03
(Felonies – Statement of Probable Cause – Contents); subdivision
22.04 (Felonies – Warrant of Arrest – When Issued); the heading
title and subdivision 22.05 (Felonies – Warrant of Arrest –
Contents); the heading title and subdivision 22.07 (Felonies –
Appearance Under Warrant Before Judge); the heading title and
subdivision 22.08 (Felonies – Initial Proceedings Before Judge);
and subdivision 22.09 (Felonies – Preliminary Hearing) of Rule
22, entitled “Procedure Applicable to Felonies Only,” and in lieu
thereof adopted a new subdivision 22.03 (Felonies – Statement
of Probable Cause – Contents); a new subdivision 22.04
(Felonies – Warrant of Arrest – When Issued); a new heading
title and a new subdivision 22.05 (Felonies – Warrant for Arrest
– Contents); a new heading title and a new subdivision 22.07
(Felonies – Appearance Under Warrant Before the Court); a
new heading title and a new subdivision 22.08 (Felonies – Initial
Appearance Before the Court); and a new subdivision 22.09
(Felonies – Preliminary Hearing).
In addition, the Court repealed subdivision 33.01
(Misdemeanors or Felonies – Right to Release – Conditions); the
heading title and subdivision 33.02 (Misdemeanors or Felonies
– Warrant for Arrest – Oicials Authorized to Set Conditions
of Release – Conditions to be Stated on Warrant); subdivision
33.04 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Oicer Authorized to Accept
Conditions of Release); the heading title and subdivision 33.05
(Misdemeanors or Felonies – Right to Review of Conditions);
subdivision 33.06 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Modiication
of Conditions of Release); subdivision 33.07 (Misdemeanors
or Felonies – Rules of Evidence Inapplicable); the heading title
and subdivision 33.08 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Rearrest
of Accused); subdivision 33.09 (Misdemeanors or Felonies –
Failure of Court to Set Conditions or Setting of Inadequate
or Excessive Conditions for Release – Application to Higher
continued on page 54
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TAXES IN YOUR PRACTICE

NEW DEVELOPMENTS
FOR 2019
Scott E. Vincent1
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA) created substantial
changes for taxpayers. As
practitioners and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) work
through implementation of the
TCJA, guidance is being issued
from the IRS. This article
outlines several key items for
consideration as we begin
2019.

perform duties for the employer. Under this “convenience of
the employer” test, carrying out of the employee’s duties must
require that the employer provide the employee meals so that
the employee can properly discharge such duties and be done for
noncompensatory business reasons. Treasury regulations include
meals provided for employees with short meal periods due to
the employer’s business or employees who must be available
for emergency calls during meal periods. Prior cases have
found that the IRS is precluded from substituting its judgment
for the business decisions of a taxpayer regarding business
needs and related employer policies. However, the IRS can
determine whether an employer actually follows and enforces
its own stated business policies and practices, and whether these
policies and practices, and the needs and concerns they address,
necessitate the provision of meals so that there is a substantial
noncompensatory business reason for furnishing
meals to employees.

Depreciation and Expensing
The IRS has issued Revenue Procedure 2019-8
Business Meals and Entertainment
with
guidance on deducting expenses under § 179
The TCJA disallowed deductions for
and
the
alternate depreciation system (ADS) under
entertainment, amusement, and recreation
§
168(g),
as amended by the TCJA. The Revenue
activities. However, the new provisions did not
Procedure
explains how qualiied real property, as
address when the food and beverages might
deined
under
the TCJA, can be treated as property
constitute entertainment. The IRS has issued new
eligible for the § 179 expense election. The TCJA
guidance (Notice 2018-76) allowing taxpayers
increased the § 179 deduction to $1 million and
to deduct 50 percent of business meal expenses
increased the phase-out limit to $2.5 million,
if: (a) the expense is an ordinary and necessary
with indexing for inlation after 2018. The TCJA
Scott E. Vincent
trade or business expense; (b) the expense is not
also amended the deinition of qualiied real
lavish or extravagant under the circumstances; (c)
property
to
include
qualiied improvement property and some
the taxpayer, or an employee of the taxpayer, is present at the
improvements
to
nonresidential
real property, including: roofs;
furnishing of the food or beverages; (d) the food and beverages
heating,
ventilation
and
air-conditioning
property; ire protection
are provided to a current or potential business customer, client,
and alarm systems; and security systems. The Revenue
consultant, or similar business contact; and (e) in the case of
Procedure outlines how real property trades or businesses or
food and beverages provided during or at an entertainment
farming businesses that elect out of the TCJA interest deduction
activity, the food and beverages are purchased separately from
limitations may change to the ADS for property placed in service
the entertainment, or the cost of the food and beverages is stated
before 2018; the IRS also addresses whether these changes may
separately from the cost of the entertainment on one or more
be a change in accounting method. In addition, the Revenue
bills, invoices, or receipts.
Procedure provides an optional depreciation table for residential
rental property depreciated under the ADS with a 30-year
Meals for Convenience of Employer
recovery period.
The IRS has issued counsel advice (AM 2018-004)
regarding the Code § 119 exclusion from employee income for
meals furnished on the employer’s business premises for the
convenience of the employer. In Commissioner v. Kowalski,2 the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that the § 119 exclusion only
applies if meals are necessary for the employee to properly

Partnerships
The IRS issued inal regulations implementing the new
centralized partnership audit regime. The inal regulations are
generally efective for partnership tax years beginning after 2017,
@MoBarNews

@MoBarNews
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but partnerships can make an election to have the provisions
apply to earlier periods. Under the new rules, adjustments to
partnership-related items are determined at the partnership
level. The inal regulations clarify that items or amounts are
partnership-related items only if shown, or required to be
shown, on the partnership return or required to be maintained
in the partnership’s books and records. Partners must report
these partnership-related items consistent with the treatment
on the partnership’s return or provide adequate notice to the
IRS of inconsistent treatment. A partner can provide notice to
the IRS of inconsistent treatment by attaching a statement to
the partner’s return (including any amended return) on which
the partnership-related item is treated inconsistently. If the IRS
adjusts partnership-related items, the partnership, rather than
the partners, is subject to liability for any imputed underpayment
and must take other adjustments into account in the adjustment
year. Alternatively, the regulations allow a partnership to
make an election to distribute the efect of the adjustments
to its partners for the year that adjustments are made by the
IRS, causing the partners to pay any tax due as a result of the
adjustments.
State and Local Tax and Charitable Contributions
For tax years beginning after 2017, the TCJA limits an
individual’s deduction to $10,000 ($5,000 in the case of a
married individual iling a separate return) for the aggregate
amount of the following state and local taxes paid during the
calendar year: (1) real property taxes; (2) personal property taxes;
(3) income, war proits, and excess proits taxes; and (4) general
sales taxes. This limitation does not apply to certain taxes that
are paid and incurred in carrying on a trade or business or
a for-proit activity. Since the enactment of the TCJA, some
taxpayers sought to avoid the limitation by making deductible
charitable payments to charitable entities pursuant to state and
local tax credit programs. During 2018, the IRS issued guidance
undermining this strategy, inding that charitable contributions
were reduced by the amount of any “quid pro quo” return tax
credit beneit. However, the IRS has now released Revenue
Procedure 2019-12 with safe harbors that do allow a deduction
for certain payments made by a C corporation or a “speciied
pass-through entity” to or for the use of a charitable organization
if the paying entity receives or expects to receive a state or local
tax credit in return for the payment. If qualiied, the payment
is treated as meeting the requirements of an ordinary and
necessary business expense for the business entity.
The Revenue Procedure safe harbor only applies to speciied
pass-through if: (1) the entity is a business entity other than a C
corporation that is regarded for all federal income tax purposes
as separate from its owners; (2) the entity operates a trade or
business; (3) the entity is subject to a state or local tax incurred
in carrying on its trade or business that is imposed directly
on the entity; and (4) in return for a payment to a charitable
organization, the entity receives or expects to receive a state or
local tax credit that the entity applies or expects to apply to ofset
a state or local tax described in (3), above, other than a state or
local income tax.
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Suspension of Personal Exemption
The IRS issued Notice 2018-84 with interim guidance to
clarify how the suspension of the personal exemption deduction
from 2018 through 2025 under the TCJA applies to certain rules
that reference that provision but were not also suspended. These
include rules dealing with the healthcare premium tax credit,
and the individual shared responsibility provision (also known
as the individual mandate) for 2018. The notice conirms that,
for purposes of other provisions, the suspension of the personal
exemption by reducing the exemption amount to zero shall not
be considered in determining whether a deduction is allowed or
allowable, or whether a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction. The
reduction of the personal exemption to zero is not intended to
alter the operation of other provisions of the Code that refer to a
taxpayer allowed a deduction.
Afordable Care Act Hardship Exemption and Deadline
Extensions
The IRS has issued Notice 2019-5 with additional hardship
exemptions from the individual shared responsibility payment
(also known as the individual mandate) that a taxpayer may
claim on a federal income tax return without obtaining a
hardship exemption certiication from the Health Insurance
Marketplace. The IRS also issued Notice 2018-94 extending one
of the due dates for the 2018 information reporting requirements
under the ACA for insurers, self-insuring employers, and
certain other providers of minimum essential coverage, and
the information reporting requirements for applicable large
employers (ALEs). If applicable, the due date for these parties
to furnish certain ACA forms is extended to March 4, 2019.
Transition relief from certain penalties for good faith eforts to
comply with the ACA information reporting requirements is also
extended.
Limitation on Business Interest Expense Deductions
For tax years beginning after 2017, the TCJA provides that the
deduction allowed for business interest for any tax year cannot
exceed the sum of: (1) business interest income; (2) 30 percent
of adjusted taxable income (but not less than zero); plus (3) loor
plan inancing interest (certain interest paid by vehicle dealers).
The term “business interest” means any interest properly
allocable to a trade or business. However, the deduction limit on
business interest does not apply to interest properly allocable to
an “electing real property trade or business.” The IRS has issued
Revenue Procedure 2018-59 to provide a safe harbor that allows
taxpayers to treat certain infrastructure trades or businesses
as real property trades or businesses solely for purposes of
qualifying as an electing real property trade or business. The
Revenue Procedure identiies infrastructure property that
may qualify, including airports, docks, ports, mass commuting
facilities, water furnishing and disposal facilities, sewage and
waste disposal facilities, and several others.
Penalty Avoidance
The IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2019-9 identifying
circumstances under which disclosure on a taxpayer’s income
mobar.org

tax return with respect to an item or position is adequate to
reduce understatement of tax for purposes of the substantial
understatement accuracy-related penalty and for purposes of
the tax return preparer penalty for understatements due to
unreasonable positions. The Revenue Procedure applies to
2018 tax returns and outlines speciic information that must be
provided for certain items, including: itemized deductions on
Form 1040 (Schedule A); certain trade or business expenses;
diferences in book and income tax reporting; certain foreign tax
items; and other items such as moving expenses and employee
business expenses. The Revenue Procedure also requires that
money amounts entered on a form must be veriiable, which
means the taxpayer can prove the origin of the amount (even
if that number is not ultimately accepted by the IRS) and the
taxpayer can show good faith in entering that number on the
applicable form. Further, when the amount of an item is shown

on a line that does not have a preprinted description (such as
on an unnamed line under an “Other Expense” category), the
taxpayer must clearly identify the item by including a description
on that line. For items not covered by this Revenue Procedure
and for related party transactions, adequate disclosure requires
iling a Form 8275 (Disclosure Statement) or 8275-R (Regulation
Disclosure Statement).
Conclusion
Hopefully, this is a good summary for review by you and
your clients as we begin 2019. Be careful to watch for ongoing
changes in Congress and at the IRS in coming months.
Endnote

1 Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas
City.
2 Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
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IN MEMORIAM
John H. Bleckman, age 70, of St. Louis on September 23,
2018. He joined The Missouri Bar in 1984 and practiced law in
St. Louis.
David N. Clayton of Hannibal on December 8, 2018 at
the age of 46. He received his law degree from the University
of Missouri-Kansas City. He irst joined the Public Defender
Oice in Columbia. In 2014, Governor Jay Nixon appointed
him Marion County prosecutor. He was later elected to that
position and served until his death. He was a member of
The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Association of Prosecuting
Attorneys, and the 10th Judicial Circuit Bar Association.
Donald H. Clooney, age 88, of St. Louis on November 25,
2018. He is a veteran of the U.S. Air Force, where he served as
a captain and was drafted by the U.S. Water Polo Team to play
in the 1952 Olympics. He earned his law degree from Saint
Louis University and practiced law for more than 50 years.
Hon. Frank D. Connett Jr. of St. Joseph on November 6,
2018 at the age of 96. He served in the U.S. Army Air Corps
during World War II. In 1949, he received an LL.B. degree
from the University of Missouri. He served as Buchanan
County assistant prosecuting attorney from 1951-1954 and as
prosecutor from 1955-1958. In 1957, he was president of the
Missouri Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. Beginning in
1958, he was an elected judge of Division III of the 5th Judicial
Circuit for 30 years. He served as an honorary colonel on the
staf of Governor John Dalton. In 2002, the Missouri Bar
Foundation honored him with the Spurgeon Smithson Award.
Edward A. Cook III, age 88, of Georgetown, TX on August
13, 2018. During the Korean War he served in the U.S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps. He received his law degree from
the University of Missouri and joined The Missouri Bar in
1953. For ive decades he practiced law in Lexington, NE
with Cook & Cook Law Oice, and later Cook, Kopf &
Doyle Law Oice. He was also president of First State Bank
in Gothenburg, NE and president of the Nebraska Cultural
Endowment.
Hon. Wesley C. Dalton of Wright City on December 16,
2018 at the age of 60. He joined The Missouri Bar in 1988,
and was the presiding circuit judge for the 12th Judicial Circuit,
comprised of Warren, Montgomery and Audrain counties.
Gary I. Froistad, age 75, of Savannah, GA on October 25,
2018. He earned his J.D. from the University of South Dakota
and joined The Missouri Bar in 1990.
Virginia L. Fry of Springield on November 18, 2018 at the
age of 64. She earned her J.D. from the University of MissouriKansas City. In 1994, she was the irst female president of the
Springield Metropolitan Bar, and is the only woman to receive
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its Distinguished Attorney Award. In 1998, she joined Husch
Blackwell, LLP as a partner, serving as oice managing partner
from 2008 until 2015. She served as a member of The Missouri
Bar Board of Governors from 2007-2008. In 2015, Missouri
Lawyers Media honored her as Woman of the Year. She was
elected as chair of the Missouri State University Board of
Governors in 2017.
Susan M. Hunt, at 66, on November 27, 2018. Prior to
receiving her law degree from the University of MissouriKansas City, she was a chemist with the Kansas City Police
Department. She joined The Missouri Bar in 1986 and spent
most of her career as a solo pracitioner.
Edwin P. McKaskel of Wildwood on March 1, 2018 at the
age of 79. He received his law degree from the University
of Mississippi and joined The Missouri Bar in 1977. After
graduation, he became a special agent for the F.B.I., then
general manager of asset protection for AT&T, retiring after 35
years.
Joseph J. Nitka Jr. of St. Louis on July 12, 2018 at the age of
89. He received his law degree from Saint Louis University and
joined The Missouri Bar in 1956. He retired at the age of 82
after serving as a labor arbitrator for more than 40 years.
Pastor/Honorable John F. Payne, age 72, of Kansas
City on November 4, 2018. He was a veteran of the U.S. Air
Force and earned his J.D. from the University of MissouriKansas City. He practiced law as a partner of Gray, Payne &
Roque before serving as a family court commissioner for the
16th Judicial Circuit Court, Juvenile Division 41, for nearly 18
years, retiring in 2008. In 2003, the Missouri Governor and
General Assembly established the commission on Children’s
Justice and named Payne as a member. Ordained in 1992, he
was called to be pastor of the Temple of Faith in 2003. He
served as a member of the board of Niles Home for Children
and in November 2009 was named Outstanding Family
Advocate-2009 by the Cornerstones of Care.
Stacey M. Reines of Overland Park, KS on October 18,
2018 at the age of 63. She received her J.D. from Washington
University and joined The Missouri Bar in 1981. She started
her career as in-house counsel at the Housing Authority of
Kansas City and most recently worked at Meico Lamp Parts.
Daniel D. Sawyer, age 89, of Leawood, KS on October
15, 2018. In 1946, he joined the U.S. Army Air Forces and
served in Japan as a paratrooper. In 1956, he earned his law
degree from the University of Missouri-Kansas City and joined
The Missouri Bar. That same year, he joined the law irm of
Hubbell, Lane & Sawyer, where he practiced law for more than
40 years before his retirement. He then served as of counsel
for the Barnes Law Firm for several years before his inal
mobar.org

retirement. In addition to being past president of the Missouri
Association of Trial Attorneys, he was an active member of
the VFW, having served as commander of Pete Dover Post
302.
Hon. Harvey J. Schramm of Brentwood on December
9, 2018 at the age of 80. He was a veteran of the U.S. Army,
serving in the Active Army Reserves from 1960-1961. He
earned his law degree from Washington University and
served as St. Louis County prosecutor for three years before
the governor appointed him as judge at the St. Louis County
Courthouse, where he served eight years. He continued in his
private law practice for more than 35 years. He also served as
president of the St. Louis Chapter of B’nai B’rith and on the
board of directors of the American Jewish Congress.
Don R. Wintermeyer of Georgetown, TX on July 27, 2018
at the age of 77. He joined The Missouri Bar in 1966.

The Journal of The Missouri Bar publishes items in the "In Memoriam" section as
they are received. To honor the lives and achievements of deceased members,
The Missouri Bar solicits additional information about these men and women from
family members or printed obituaries. When that information is not provided or
is otherwise unavailable, the Journal will print only the deceased’s name, city of
residence, and date of death.
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academics, community members, elected oicials, or other
interested stakeholders, Missouri lawyers are positioned and
able to help others work together to address today’s problems
in a productive and collaborative way. I invite you to join your
Missouri Bar in fostering these important conversations to
improve our profession, the law, and the lives of our fellow
Missourians.

Endnotes

1 Raymond E. Williams is an attorney with Williams Law Oices, LLC in
West Plains.
2 See Joseph P. Lash, Helen and Teacher: The Story of Helen Keller and Anne Sullivan
Macy (Radclife 1980).
3 See The Role of the Convenor, National Policy Consensus Center, www.
policyconcsensus.org/publicsolutions/ps_6.html.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Dan Kittay, Bringing People Together: The Bar’s Role as Convener, BaR
leadeR, Jan.-Feb. 2018.

@MoBarNews

@MoBarNews

35

THE LAWYERS’ MART
THE CHOICE OF A LAWYER IS AN IMPORTANT DECISION AND SHOULD NOT BE BASED
SOLELY UPON ADVERTISEMENTS.
ATTORNEY SERVICES

SPECIAL SERVICES

Trademark Searches & Registrations
Copyright Registrations
“Representing Law Firms Who Do Not Have Their Own
Trademark Attorney Since 1983”
Annette P. Heller
314-469-2610
www.trademarkatty.com

HANDWRITING EXPERT
FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINER
DOCUMENTS IN DISPUTE, INC.
Lynda Hartwick, Police Detective (ret)
Secret Service Trained – Board Certiied
www.docsindispute.com
314-791-6633; 573-964-5159

Chicago/Illinois Attorney – Missouri Bar member. Wash.
U. Law grad, available for referral or to serve as local counsel
in Chicago and Northern Illinois. Steven I. Rapaport,
847/559-9270. E-mail: raplaw@ameritech.net.

HYDRO-ENGINEERS, LLC
A case building technical research service exclusively for
lawyers. Provides detailed engineering investigations, report
preparation, case preparation advice, and reference to expert
witnesses. Specializing in cases involving water issues and civil
engineering. Registered Professional Engineers with Ph.D.s;
707 Rutland Drive, Columbia, MO 65203; (O)573/447-0245;
(C)573/578-9773; e-mail: hydro@centurylink.net.

Classified Ad Rates: $1.25 per word for members of The Missouri Bar or surviving spouse of deceased members ($30 minimum); $2.00 per word for nonmembers and for organizations not related to The Missouri Bar ($50 minimum). No discount for repeat insertions. Copy for ads must be received 15 days
prior to the first day of the month of issue: February, April, June, August, October and December. Any element surrounded by spaces is a word.
File Numbers: If a file number is used, e-mailed responses should have a subject line of File (No.) and be sent to cheerboth@mobar.org. Mailed responses to
the ad should be addressed: File (No.), Journal of The Missouri Bar, P.O. Box 119, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0119.
Publication of advertising in The Lawyers’ Mart is not an endorsement by The Missouri Bar or the Journal of the goods or services advertised.
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DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
Disbarments
11/20/18 Richard L. Winkie
#59455
101 E. Sheridan St.
P.O. Box 502
Macon, MO 63552
1/9/19

Jefrey B. Allen
#58252
255 N. Adams, Ste. C
P.O. Box 996
Lebanon, MO 65536

Suspensions
10/30/18 Bryce C. Crowley
#64800
901 N. Pine St., #110
Rolla, MO 65401
11/20/18 Mary L. Lemp
#63027
1717 Park Ave.
St. Louis, MO 63104
12/4/18 Bryan E. Bennett
#54779
65A King St.
Burlington, VT 05401
12/18/19 Scott A. Bailey
#47515
518 S. Hanley Rd.
St. Louis, MO 63105
12/27/18 Babette P. Salus
#35321
1100 S. 5th St.
Springield, IL 62703

Reprimands
12/4/18 Joe G. Harms II
#23989
111 N. Taylor Ave., Ste. C
Kirkwood, MO 63122
12/4/18 David C. Salivar
#24205
111 N. Taylor Ave., Ste. C
Kirkwood, MO 63122
12/18/18 Brent L. Winterberg
#44038
4310 Madison Ave., Ste. 209
Kansas City, MO 64111-3435

Probations
11/21/18 Raymund J. Capelovitch
#41537
7470 Stanford Ave.
St. Louis, MO 63130
12/4/18 Joel B. Eisenstein
#21476
600 Hill Pointe Ct., Ste. 200
St. Charles, MO 63309
12/18/18 William Asa Hutchinson III
#60278
912 W. Central Ave.
Bentonville, AR 72712

Reinstatements
11/5/18 C. Christopher Lozano
#39497
8019 Knights Crossing Dr.
O’Fallon, MO 63368
12/4/18 David A. Kraft
#49512
12308 Wegona Ln.
Leawood, KS 66209

Completed Probation
11/1/18 Timothy Belz
#31808
112 S. Hanley, Ste. 200
St. Louis, MO 63105
11/1/18 Robert B. Leggat Jr.
#23780
112 S. Hanley, Ste. 200
St. Louis, MO 63105
11/1/18 Lamar E. Ottsen Jr.
#18682
112 S. Hanley, Ste. 200
St. Louis, MO 63105
11/26/18 Bradford C. Emert
#36118
11934 Bedford Dr.
St. Louis, MO 63131
12/6/18 Jay R. Yorke
#35023
16 E. Stoddard St.
P.O. Box 621
Dexter, MO 63841
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NOTICES OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
Notice of Corporate Dissolution Rates: $1.25 per word for a member of
The Missouri Bar; $2.00 for non-members. For purposes of the total word
count, any element surrounded by spaces is considered to be a word. DO
NOT SEND A CHECK with the notice. You will be invoiced in advance of
publication, and all invoices must be paid prior to publication.
Copy must be received by February 20 (for March/April issue), April 20 (for
May/June issue), June 20 (for July/August issue), August 20 (for September/
October issue), October 20 (for November/December issue), and December
20 (for January/February issue).
Send notices to Cynthia Heerboth at The Missouri Bar, P.O. Box 119,
Jefferson City, MO 65101, by e-mail to cheerboth@mobar.org.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
WIL-MAR ACRES, LP
On October 16, 2018, WIL-MAR ACRES, LP, a Missouri
limited partnership, iled a Cancellation of Registration with the
Missouri Secretary of State.
Persons with claims against the limited partnership are
requested to present them in accordance with the Notice
of Winding Up. You must furnish your name, address, and
telephone number together with the following: (1) Amount of
the claim; (2) Basis for the claim; and (3) Documentation of the
claim.
Claims must be mailed to: Robert C. Black, 245 Main St.,
P.O. Box 2058, Platte City, MO 64079.
A claim against the limited partnership will be barred unless
a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3)
years after the publication of this notice.

in writing of the circumstances surrounding your claim to the
Corporation in care of Patrick E. White, P.O. Box 7183, Kansas
City, MO 64113. The summary of your claim must include the
following information:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of the claimant.
2. The amount of the claim.
3. The date on which the event on which the claim is based
occurred.
4. A brief description of the nature of the debt or the basis for
the claim.
All claims against The Green Company, Inc. will be barred
unless the proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within
two years after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
ARBORS AT KEHRS MILL, LLC
Arbors at Kehrs Mill, LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company, iled its Notice of Winding Up with the Missouri
Secretary of State on October 30, 2018.
Any and all claims against Arbors at Kehrs Mill, LLC may be
sent to Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road, St. Louis,
Missouri 63129. Each claim should include the following
information: the name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; the amount of the claim; the basis for the claim; and the
date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
Any and all claims against Arbors at Kehrs Mill, LLC will be
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
ABLES MANOR PROPERTIES, LLC
On October 30, 2018, Ables Manor Properties, LLC, a
Missouri limited liability company (hereinafter the “Company”),
iled its Notice of Winding Up for a Limited Liability Company
with the Missouri Secretary of State.
Any claims against the Company may be sent to: Terry Cole,
1311 Columbine, Sikeston, Missouri 63801. Each claim
must include the following information: name, address, and
phone number of the claimant; amount claimed; date on which
the claim arose; the basis for the claim; and documentation in
support of the claim.
All claims against the Company will be barred unless the
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years
after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
DEER & DUCKS, LLC
Deer & Ducks, LLC, a Missouri limited liability company, iled
its Notice of Winding Up with the Missouri Secretary of State on
October 30, 2018.
Any and all claims against Deer & Ducks, LLC may be sent to
Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road, St. Louis, Missouri
63129. Each claim should include the following information:
the name, address, and telephone number of the claimant; the
amount of the claim; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
Any and all claims against Deer & Ducks Mill, LLC will be
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
THE GREEN CORPORATION
On October 30, 2018, The Green Company, Inc. iled its
articles of dissolution with the Missouri Secretary of State. The
dissolution was efective on October 30, 2018.
You are hereby notiied that if you believe you have a claim
against The Green Company, Inc., you must submit a summary

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
THE VILLAS AT SUSON HILLS, LLC
The Villas at Suson Hills, LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company, iled its Notice of Winding Up with the Missouri
Secretary of State on October 30, 2018.
Any and all claims against The Villas at Suson Hills, LLC may
be sent to Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road,
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St. Louis, Missouri 63129. Each claim should include the
following information: the name, address, and telephone number
of the claimant; the amount of the claim; the basis for the claim;
and the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based
occurred.
Any and all claims against The Villas at Suson Hills, LLC will
be barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
WILMAS FARM, LLC
Wilmas Farm, LLC, a Missouri limited liability company, iled
its Notice of Winding Up with the Missouri Secretary of State
on October 30, 2018.
Any and all claims against Wilmas Farm, LLC may be sent to
Robert Berra, 5091 New Baumgartner Road, St. Louis, Missouri
63129. Each claim should include the following information:
the name, address, and telephone number of the claimant; the
amount of the claim; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
Any and all claims against Wilmas Farm, LLC will be barred
unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced within
three (3) years after the date this notice is published.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
KCL GEORGIA CREDIT PARTNERS IIA, LLC
KCL Georgia Credit Partners IIA, LLC iled its Notice of
Winding Up on November 5, 2018.
The company requests that all claims be presented
immediately by letter to: Malika Simmons, c/o Kansas City Life
Insurance Company, 3520 Broadway, KCMO 64111. Claims
must include name, address, and telephone number of claimant;
amount; the basis for the claim; and documentation.
All claims against the company shall be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years
after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MCP 2010, LLC
MCP 2010, LLC iled its Notice of Winding Up on
November 5, 2018.
The company requests that all claims be presented
immediately by letter to: Malika Simmons, c/o Kansas City Life
Insurance Company, 3520 Broadway, KCMO 64111. Claims
must include name, address, and telephone number of claimant;
amount; the basis for the claim; and documentation.
All claims against the company shall be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years
after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MISSOURI CREDIT PARTNERS 2002, LLC
Missouri Credit Partners 2002, LLC iled its Notice of
Winding Up on November 5, 2018.
The company requests that all claims be presented
immediately by letter to: Malika Simmons, c/o Kansas City Life
Insurance Company, 3520 Broadway, KCMO 64111. Claims
must include name, address, and telephone number of claimant;
amount; the basis for the claim; and documentation.
All claims against the company shall be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years
after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
PREMIER PAPER AND PACKAGING, INC.
On October 8, 2018, Premier Paper and Packaging, Inc., a
Missouri corporation (the “Corporation”), iled its Articles of
Dissolution with the Missouri Secretary of State. The dissolution
was efective upon this date.
You are hereby notiied that if you believe you have a claim
against the Corporation, you must submit a written summary of
your claim to the Corporation care of The Law Firm of Haden
& Haden, ATTN: Brent Haden, PO Box 7166, Columbia, MO
65205. The summary of your claim must include the following
information:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of claimant;
2. The amount of the claim;
3. The date on which the claim is based occurred;
4. A brief description of the nature of the debt or the basis of
the claim; and
5. Whether the claim is secured, and if so, the collateral used
as security.
All claims against the Corporation will be barred unless this
summary is received within 2 years of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LBR – LAMBERT, LLC
On November 7, 2018, LBR – Lambert, LLC iled its Notice
of Winding Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri
Secretary of State. The notice was efective on November 7,
2018.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you believe you
have a claim against LBR – Lambert, LLC, you must submit a
summary in writing of the circumstances surrounding your claim
to the said LBR – Lambert, LLC at the following address:
LBR – Lambert, LLC, 2107 Ridgecrest Street, Chillicothe,
Missouri 64601.
Telephone: (660) 973-4490.
The summary of your claim must include the following information:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of the claimant;
2. The amount of the claim;
3. The date on which the event for which the claim is based occurred;
and
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4. A brief description of the nature of the debt or the basis for
the claim.
All claims against LBR – Lambert, LLC will be barred unless
the proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three
(3) years after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LBR – FAIR, LLC
On November 7, 2018, LBR – Fair, LLC iled its Notice of
Winding Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri
Secretary of State. The notice was efective on November 7,
2018.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you believe you
have a claim against LBR – Fair, LLC, you must submit a
summary in writing of the circumstances surrounding your claim
to the said LBR – Fair, LLC at the following address:
LBR – Fair, LLC, 2107 Ridgecrest Street, Chillicothe,
Missouri 64601.
Telephone: (660) 973-4490.
The summary of your claim must include the following
information:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of the claimant;
2. The amount of the claim;
3. The date on which the event for which the claim is based
occurred; and
4. A brief description of the nature of the debt or the basis for
the claim.
All claims against LBR – Fair, LLC will be barred unless the
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3)
years after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LBR – FAIRVIEW, LLC
On November 7, 2018, LBR – Fairview, LLC iled its Notice
of Winding Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri
Secretary of State. The notice was efective on November 7,
2018.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that if you believe you
have a claim against LBR – Fairview, LLC, you must submit a
summary in writing of the circumstances surrounding your claim
to the said LBR – Fairview, LLC at the following address:
LBR – Fairview, LLC, 2107 Ridgecrest Street, Chillicothe,
Missouri 64601.
Telephone: (660) 973-4490.
The summary of your claim must include the following
information:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of the claimant;
2. The amount of the claim;
3. The date on which the event for which the claim is based
occurred; and
4. A brief description of the nature of the debt or the basis for
the claim.
All claims against LBR – Fairview, LLC will be barred unless
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the proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three
(3) years after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
ABC OF SOUTHEAST MISSOURI, L.L.C.
On November 9, 2018, ABC of Southeast Missouri, L.L.C., a
Missouri limited liability company (hereinafter the “Company”),
iled its Notice of Winding Up for a Limited Liability Company
with the Missouri Secretary of State.
Any claims against the Company may be sent to: Terry Cole,
1515 East Malone, Sikeston, Missouri 63801. Each claim
must include the following information: name, address, and
phone number of the claimant; amount claimed; date on which
the claim arose; the basis for the claim; and documentation in
support of the claim.
All claims against the Company will be barred unless the
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years
after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO
ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS
AGAINST GREEN CROW, LLC
Notice is hereby given that Green Crow, LLC, a Missouri
limited liability company (the “Company”), is being liquidated
and dissolved pursuant to the Missouri Limited Liability
Company Act (the “Act”). This notice is being given pursuant to
Section 347.141 of the Act.
All persons with claims against the Company should submit
them in writing in accordance with this notice to: Vatterott
Harris P.C., Attn: Paul J. Harris, 2458 Old Dorsett Road,
Suite 230, Maryland Heights, MO 63043.
Claims against the Company must include: (1) the claimant’s
name, address, and phone number; (2) the amount claimed;
(3) the date the claim arose; (4) the basis of the claim; and (5)
documentation supporting the claim.
A claim against the Company will be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is enforced within three years
after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS
AGAINST FIRST BANC INSURANCE
SERVICES CORPORATION
On October 16, 2018, FIRST BANC INSURANCE
SERVICES CORPORATION, a Missouri corporation, iled its
Articles of Dissolution by Voluntary Action with the Secretary of
State of Missouri, efective on October 16, 2018.
Any claims against FIRST BANC INSURANCE SERVICES
CORPORATION may be sent to: Legal Department, 11901
Olive Blvd., Suite 212 Creve Coeur, Missouri 63141. Each claim
must include the following information: name, address, and
telephone number of the claimant; amount claimed; date on
which the claim arose; basis for the claim; and documentation
supporting the claim.
mobar.org

Each claim will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce it is
commenced within two (2) years after publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
SUMMER CASUAL, LLC
You are hereby notiied that on November 6, 2018, Summer
Casual, LLC, a Missouri limited liability company (“LLC”) was
dissolved upon the iling of its Articles of Termination with the
Missouri Secretary of State.
Said LLC requests that all persons and organizations who
have claims against it present them immediately by letter to the
LLC c/o Checkett & Pauly, PC, PO Box 409, Carthage, MO
64836, Attention: Sarah Kersh. All claims must include: (1) the
name and address of the claimant; (2) the amount claimed;
(3) the basis for the claim; (4) the documentation of the claim;
and (5) the date(s) of the event(s) on which the claim is based
occurred.
Notice: Because of the termination of Summer Casual,
LLC, any claims against it will be barred unless a proceeding
to enforce the claim is commenced within three years after the
publication of this notice.

Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Master Tenant,
LLC will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim
is commenced within three (3) years after the date this notice is
published.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LAUREL APARTMENTS MASTER TENANT, LLC
Laurel Apartments Master Tenant, LLC, a Missouri limited
liability company, iled its Notice of Winding Up for Limited
Liability Company with the Missouri Secretary of State on
November 29, 2018.
Any and all claims against Laurel Apartments Master Tenant,
LLC may be sent to Brian J. Beck, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 400,
Clayton, MO 63105. Each claim should include the following
information: the name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; the amount of the claim; the basis of the claim; and the
date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
Any and all claims against Laurel Apartments Master Tenant,
LLC will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim
is commenced within three (3) years after the date this notice is
published.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LAUREL HOTEL MANAGER, LLC
Laurel Hotel Manager, LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company, iled its Notice of Winding Up for Limited Liability
Company with the Missouri Secretary of State on November 29,
2018.
Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Manager, LLC
may be sent to Brian J. Beck, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 400,
Clayton, MO 63105. Each claim should include the following
information: the name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; the amount of the claim; the basis of the claim; and
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based
occurred.
Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Manager, LLC will be
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
C & D AUTO AND MUFFLER, LLC
On December 6, 2018, C & D Auto and Muler, LLC, a
Missouri limited liability company (the “Company”), iled its
Notice of Winding Up for a Limited Liability Company with the
Missouri Secretary of State.
Any claims against the Company may be sent to: Kyle
Harmon, Lowther Johnson Attorneys at Law, LLC, 901 E St.
Louis St, 20th Floor, Springield, MO 65806. Each claim must
include the following information: name, address, and phone
number of the claimant; amount claimed; date on which the
claim arose; the basis for the claim; and documentation in
support of the claim.
All claims against the Company will be barred unless the
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three years
after publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP FOR
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LAUREL HOTEL MASTER TENANT, LLC
Laurel Hotel Master Tenant, LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company, iled its Notice of Winding Up for Limited Liability
Company with the Missouri Secretary of State on November 29,
2018.
Any and all claims against Laurel Hotel Master Tenant, LLC
may be sent to Brian J. Beck, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 400,
Clayton, MO 63105. Each claim should include the following
information: the name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; the amount of the claim; the basis of the claim; and
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based
occurred.

NOTICE OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
RANDOM APP, INC.
On December 10, 2018, Random App, Inc., a Missouri
corporation, iled its Articles of Dissolution with the Missouri
Secretary of State. Dissolution was efective on December 10, 2018.
Said corporation requests that all persons and organizations
who have claims against it present them immediately by letter to
the corporation at:
Random App., Inc.
David P. Weiss, Esq.
Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard P.C.
600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
St. Louis, MO 63101
@MoBarNews

@MoBarNews

41

All claims must include the name and address of the claimant;
the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; copies of any
documents or instruments upon which the claim arises; and
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based
occurred.
NOTICE: Because of the dissolution of Random App,
Inc., any claims against it will be barred unless a proceeding
to enforce the claim is commenced within two years after
the publication date of the two notices authorized by statute,
whichever is published last.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
SERENDIPITY GALLERY LLC
Serendipity Gallery LLC, a Missouri limited liability company
(the “Company”), was dissolved on December 9, 2018 by iling a
Notice of Winding Up with the Missouri Secretary of State.
The Company requests that all persons and entities with
claims against the Company present them in writing and by mail
to Lisa A. Houdyshell, 8124 General Sheridan Lane, St. Louis,
MO 63123.
Each claim must include:
1. The name, address, and telephone number of the claimant;
2. The amount of the claim;
3. The basis of the claim;
4. The date the claim arose; and
5. Documentation of the claim.
A claim against the Company will be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3)
years after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP
OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
KOENIG WILLIAMSBURG PROPERTY, L.P.
On this 4th day of December 2018 KOENIG
WILLIAMSBURG PROPERTY, L.P., hereinafter referred to
as (“LIMITED PARTNERSHIP”), iled its Notice of Winding
Up for a Limited Partnership with the Missouri Secretary of
State.
All persons and organizations with claims against the Limited
Partnership must submit a written summary of any and all
claims against the Limited Partnership to ZOLLMANN
LAW LLC, Attention: W. J. Zollmann, III, 511 West Pearce
Boulevard, Wentzville, Missouri 63385, which summary shall
include the name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; the amount of the claim; date(s) the claim accrued; a
brief description of the nature and basis of the claim; and any
documentation of the claim.
Claims against the Limited Partnership will be barred unless
a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3)
years after the publication of this notice.
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NOTICE OF WINDING UP
OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
KOENIG AUXVASSE PROPERTY, L.P.
On this 4th day of December 2018 KOENIG AUXVASSE
PROPERTY, L.P., hereinafter referred to as (“LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP”), iled its Notice of Winding Up for a
Limited Partnership with the Missouri Secretary of State.
All persons and organizations with claims against the Limited
Partnership must submit a written summary of any and all
claims against the Limited Partnership to ZOLLMANN
LAW LLC, Attention: W. J. Zollmann, III, 511 West Pearce
Boulevard, Wentzville, Missouri 63385, which summary shall
include the name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; the amount of the claim; date(s) the claim accrued; a
brief description of the nature and basis of the claim; and any
documentation of the claim.
Claims against the Limited Partnership will be barred unless
a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within three (3)
years after the publication of this notice.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MAXSON-SPA BUILDING LLC
Maxson-Spa Building LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company, iled its Notice of Winding Up for Limited Liability
Company with the Missouri Secretary of State on December 11,
2018.
Any and all claims against Maxson-Spa Building LLC may be
sent to Rosenblum Goldenshersh, P.C., c/o David S. Lang, Esq.,
7733 Forsyth Blvd., 4th Floor, St. Louis, MO 63105. Each claim
should include the following information: the name, address, and
telephone number of the claimant; the amount of the claim; the
basis of the claim; and the date(s) on which the event(s) on which
the claim is based occurred.
Any and all claims against Maxson-Spa Building LLC will be
barred unless a proceeding to enforce such claim is commenced
within three (3) years after the date this notice is published.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
DIAMOND LITE, INC.
On December 17, 2018, Diamond Lite, Inc. iled Articles of
Dissolution by Voluntary Action with the Missouri Secretary of
State. The dissolution was efective on December 31, 2018.
Claims against the Corporation must be submitted to
Diamond Lite, Inc., c/o Allen & Rector, P.C., Attorneys at Law,
135 Harwood Avenue, P.O. Box 1700, Lebanon, Missouri 65536.
Claims must include: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the claimant; (2) The amount and date of the claim;
and (3) a brief description of the basis of the claim, including
documentation.
NOTICE: All claims will be barred unless a proceeding to
enforce the claim is commenced within two years after the date
of the publication of this notice.
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NOTICE OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
MACKS CREEK BANCSHARES, INC.
Macks Creek Bancshares, Inc., a Missouri corporation, iled
its Articles of Dissolution with the Missouri Secretary of State.
All claims against the corporation should be sent to David
L. Wieland, Wieland & Condry, LLC, 1548 E. Primrose,
Springield, MO 65804. Each claim should include the
following: name, address, and telephone number of the
claimant; amount of the claim; the date the claim accrued; and
the basis of the claim and any documentation.
All claims against the corporation shall be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within two years
after the date of this publication.

NOTICE OF WINDING UP OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
CARRIE REDEVELOPMENT, LLC
On December 19, 2018, CARRIE REDEVELOPMENT,
LLC, a Missouri limited liability company, iled its Articles of
Termination and Notice of Winding Up for Limited Liability
Company with the Missouri Secretary of State, efective on
December 31, 2018.
Said limited liability company requests that all persons
and organizations who have claims against it present them
immediately by letter to the company at:
CARRIE REDEVELOPMENT, LLC
Attn: Mary C. Kickham, Manager
14001 New Bedford Court
Chesterield, MO 63017
With a copy to:
Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.
Attn: Anthony J. Soukenik, Esq.
600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
St. Louis, MO 63101
(314) 231-3332
All claims must include the name and address of the
claimant; the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; and
the date(s) on which the event(s) on which the claim is based
occurred.
NOTICE: Because of the notice of winding up of CARRIE
REDEVELOPMENT, LLC, any claim against it will be
barred unless a proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced
within three (3) years after the publication date of the notices
authorized by statute, whichever is published last.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF
LAS VEGAS, LLC
On December 19, 2018, COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL
SCHOOLS OF LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company, iled its Notice of Winding Up with the Missouri
Secretary of State, efective on December 19, 2018.
Said limited liability company requests that all persons
and organizations who have claims against it present them
immediately by letter to the company at:

COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF LAS
VEGAS, LLC
Attn: JR&M, LLC
648 Trade Center Boulevard
Chesterield, MO 63005
or
Ann Bodewes Stephens, Esq.
Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.
600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
St. Louis, MO 63101
All claims must include the name and address of the claimant;
the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
NOTICE: Because of the notice dissolution of
COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF LAS
VEGAS, LLC, any claim against it will be barred unless a
proceeding to enforce the claim is commenced within the
statutorily authorized timeframe after the publication date of the
notices authorized by statute, whichever is published last.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION
TO ALL CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
SNAGTAGG LLC
On November 19, 2018, SNAGTAGG LLC, a Missouri
limited liability company, iled its Notice of Winding Up with
the Missouri Secretary of State. Dissolution was efective on
December 19, 2018.
Said limited liability company requests that all persons
and organizations who have claims against it present them
immediately by letter to the company at:
SNAGTAGG LLC
Attn: James S. Gans
648 Trade Center Boulevard
Chesterield, MO 63005
or
Ann Bodewes Stephens, Esq.
Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.
600 Washington Avenue, 15th Floor
St. Louis, MO 63101
All claims must include the name and address of the claimant;
the amount claimed; the basis for the claim; and the date(s) on
which the event(s) on which the claim is based occurred.
NOTICE: Because of the dissolution of SNAGTAGG LLC,
any claim against it will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce
the claim is commenced within the statutorily authorized
timeframe after the publication date of the notices authorized by
statute, whichever is published last.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
CASA BELLA DEVELOPMENT, LLC
On December 14, 2018, Casa Bella Development, LLC, a
Missouri limited liability company, iled its Notice of Winding
Up for Limited Liability Company with the Missouri Secretary
of State.
Said limited liability company requests that all persons and
organizations who have claims against it present them by letter
immediately to the company in care of: Rick J. Muenks, Attorney
@MoBarNews
@MoBarNews
43

at Law, 3041 S. Kimbrough Avenue, Suite 106, Springield,
Missouri 65807. Claims must include name and address of
claimant; amount of claim; basis of claim; and documentation
of claim.
Pursuant to Section 347.141 RSMo, any claim against Casa
Bella Development, LLC will be barred unless a proceeding
to enforce the claim is commenced within three years after the
publication of this notice.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION OF
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TO ALL
CREDITORS OF AND CLAIMANTS AGAINST
LEXINGTON SQUARE, LLC
On December 14, 2018, Lexington Square, LLC, a Missouri

The Flag
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doctrine in Missouri. Southers v. City of Farmington, 263
S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008). The protection is
codiied by Sections 537.600 to 537.650. As a public
entity, Bi-State was entitled to sovereign immunity from
tort liability except to the extent immunity was waived
under Section 537.600.52
“By its plain language, Section 537.600 applies to the “public
entity,” Bi-State, and not its employee, Allen. Additionally, by its
plain language, it is clear that the statutory immunity aforded
Bi-State under the statute does not apply to its employee
driver.”53 “Section 537.610.5 further provides for annual
adjustments on the limit amounts listed, and, at the time of trial
court’s amended judgment in 2017, the limit amount for a single
accident or occurrence was $414,418 (rather than $300,000).”54
We ind State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d
672,675 (Mo. banc 1988) directly on point. In Trimble,
an action arose out of alleged negligence in a driver’s
operation of a Bi-State bus. The Missouri Supreme
Court concluded that Bi-State was entitled to sovereign
immunity under Section 537.600 and a reduction of
the damage award under Section 537.610; however, the
Court speciically held Bi-State’s driver was not entitled
to a reduction.55
“More recent caselaw has similarly found that the immunity
provision does not apply to the agent-employee of the
government entity….”56 “Therefore, because Missouri law
clearly provides that the statutory cap set forth in Section
537.610.2 does not apply to public employees arising out of
the operation of motor vehicles within the course of their
employment, the trial court did not err in denying Appellants’
Motion for Remittitur with respect to Allen.”57
Endnotes
1 W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is a partner
in the St. Louis law irm of Behr, McCarter & Potter, P.C.
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3 Id.
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Business Contracts and
Their Consequences
Continued from page 21

Adams to either accept Forbush’s ofer in its entirety or purchase
Forbush’s shares on the same terms and conditions as contained
in Forbush’s ofer (including the unrelated terms).
The court held that “[b]ecause Texas Shootout Provisions are
focused on setting a fair buyout price and nothing in the crosspurchase agreement indicated the Texas Shootout Provision in
this case was meant to encompass anything beyond that, . . .
the additional terms and conditions in Forbush’s ofer were not
contemplated by the Texas Shootout Provision.”64 Therefore,
Forbush’s ofer did not conform to the requirements of the
agreement’s Texas Shootout Provision.
Although non-conforming, the Eastern District held that
Forbush’s ofer was not entirely void, as the parties need not
be conined to the dictates of the Texas Shootout Provision in
winding up their business.65 After considering Adams’ partial
acceptance of Forbush’s ofer, the Eastern District held that
Adams’ “purported acceptance” was in fact a “counterofer” as it
“introduce[d] new or variant terms[.]”66 Because Forbush never
responded to Adams’ counterofer, the counterofer failed, and
the parties never reached an enforceable agreement.67
Contractual Limitations on Remedies and Damages
Another provision that partners, shareholders, or members
may include in their governing contractual business agreement
is a “limitation of liability or damages” provision. Such a
provision places limitations or prohibitions on a party’s exposure
to legal liability or damages. An example of such a provision
was considered in Jacobson Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Schnuck Markets,
Inc.68 In Jacobson, the parties’ agreement included the following
“limitation of ” provision:
[U]nless otherwise prohibited by law, neither party shall
be liable for incidental or consequential damages or
indirect, special or punitive damages. Notwithstanding
the foregoing limitations on types of damages, in the
event that [the plaintif, d/b/a XPO Logistics Supply
Chain] would otherwise be liable to Schnucks for
consequential, indirect, special or punitive damages,
XPO shall be liable to Schnucks for such damages up
to Schnucks’ self-insured retention under any applicable
insurance policy maintained by Schnucks, not to exceed
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000)[.] 69
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
considered whether such a provision barred the defendant’s
negligence claim. Defendant Schnuck contended that the
provision applied only “to contractual claims under the agreement, and
[did] not waive liability for damages consequential to a negligence
claim.”70 The plaintif, on the other hand, argued that the
limitation of liability provision applied to Schnuck’s negligence
claim, and the claim must therefore be dismissed.
“It is well-settled in Missouri that sophisticated business
entities may contractually limit future remedies.”71 Such
“[c]ontractual limitations of liability . . . for consequential
damages do not violate public policy where the language is ‘clear,
unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous.’”72 The Jacobson
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court considered the plain language of the operating agreement
and held that the provision precluded recovery on Schnuck’s
negligence claim, and dismissed the claim to the extent it sought
damages barred by the provision limiting liability.73 Jacobson
demonstrates both the wisdom in, and potential danger of,
liability limitation provisions. These provisions can protect
parties from future internal disputes, but may also have the efect
of limiting legal remedies in the event of a total breakdown of
the relationship.
Important Issues to Consider When Drafting
Agreements and Litigating Claims
The Economic Loss Doctrine
The economic loss doctrine prohibits a plaintif from seeking
to recover in tort for economic losses that are contractual in
nature.74 “The doctrine exists to protect the integrity of the
bargaining process, through which the parties have allocated
the costs and risks.”75 “Missouri courts have recognized speciic
exceptions to the economic loss doctrine in cases involving a
iduciary relationship or negligence in providing professional
services. Another recognized exception applies where the
defendant breached a public duty.”76
In Jacobson, plaintif XPO entered into an operating
agreement with defendant Schnuck “setting forth terms and
conditions under which XPO would provide certain warehouse
management services for [Schnuck’s] new distribution facility.”77
Ultimately, the relationship deteriorated, and in the ensuing
litigation between the parties, “Schnuck allege[d] that XPO was
negligent in operating the Facility. Speciically, Schnuck claimed
that XPO breached its duty of care by ‘failing to conduct its
operations pursuant to prevailing warehouse industry practices
and inadequately planning, hiring, training, staing, and
supervising’ at the Facility.”78
XPO [alleged] that Schnuck’s negligence claim should
be dismissed [pursuant to] the economic loss doctrine
because it is not independent of its breach of contract
claim; both claims reference the same subject matter of
the Agreement – management of the Facility, and the
same standard of care – “prevailing warehouse industry
standards.”79
The Eastern District disagreed with XPO and denied its
motion to dismiss Schnuck’s negligence claim on the basis of
the economic loss doctrine. Although XPO’s agreement “to
adhere to [certain] performance requirements” originated in the
operating agreement, Missouri law provides that “while a mere
breach of contract does not provide a basis for tort liability, the
negligent act or omission which breaches the contract may serve
as a basis for an action in tort.”80
In determining whether a claim is prohibited by the economic
loss doctrine, the following should be considered: “If the duty
arises solely from the contract, the action is contractual. The
action may be in tort, however, if the party sues for breach of
a duty recognized by the law as arising from the relationship or
status the parties have created by their agreement.”81
Applying this, the Eastern District held that because
Schnuck allege[d] that XPO was obligated to “perform
the services necessary for the proper, accurate and eicient
operation of the Facility” and to perform those services
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“in a good, professional, workmanlike, expeditious, and
economical manner, consistent with the most eicient
operation of the warehouse in accordance with the
standards and prevailing practices in the warehouse
industry,” . . . Schnuck’s negligence claim [did] not arise
solely in contract and [would] not be dismissed [pursuant
to the economic loss doctrine.]82

. . . last pronouncement by the Supreme Court of
Missouri…in Grissum [v. Reesman], 505 S.W.2d 81, noted
that the burden is a preponderance of the evidence
unless the joint venture at issue involves “an oral contract
to convey real estate or the establishment of a resulting
trust in real property,” in which case the higher clear and
convincing burden applies.92

Additionally, the Eastern District held that where, as in
Jacobson, the “contracting parties ‘require the exercise of
reasonable skill, diligence, and care in the handling of business
given over or entrusted to’ a defendant, a special relationship . . .
is created by [that] contract.”83 In that case, “[a] tort action may
be pursued ‘if the party sues for breach of a duty recognized by
the law as arising from the relationship or status the parties have
created by their agreement.’”84
Lastly, Schnuck “assert[ed] that because XPO provided
professional services to Schnuck and held itself out as a
professional by representing it was skilled in the warehousing
business and capable of operating the Facility consistently with
prevailing practices in the warehousing industry, the professional
services exception to the economic loss doctrine applie[d].”85
The professional services exception to the economic loss doctrine
“is applied to negligence claims involving [individuals] who have
been held to a professional, rather than an ordinary, standard
of care and who have provided professional services to the
plaintif.”86 The court agreed that this exception could apply, and
declined to rule that Schnuck’s negligence claim arose solely in
contract and was barred by the economic loss doctrine.

Relying on this Supreme Court of Missouri precedent, the
Morley court held that the correct standard in determining
whether a joint venture exists is preponderance of the evidence.93 “The
clear and convincing standard . . . is simply the exception to the
general rule for those two particular categories of cases.”94
Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, the
Morley court considered whether there was a dispute of fact
regarding the existence of a joint venture. Plaintif Morley
argued there was “ample evidence of the parties’ . . . intent to
carry on . . . as co-owners[,]”95 including:

Joint Ventures and Morley v. Square, Inc.
A “joint venture” is subject to the same legal principles as a
partnership.87 “Indeed, the legal principles for determining the
existence of a joint venture have been said to be identical to
those for determining a partnership, and the two may be created
in the same ways.”88 In Morley, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, applied Missouri
law to determine whether a joint venture existed between
plaintif Morley and defendants McKelvey and Dorsey. Plaintif
Morley “allege[d] that Dorsey, McKelvey, and Morley ‘agreed
to create and develop a mobile credit card transaction business’
which ‘used [plaintif] Morley’s inventions [and ideas].’”89
Plaintif [Morley] allege[d] that McKelvey and Dorsey
breached the [joint venture] agreement by refusing to
recognize Morley’s one-third ownership and control
interests, incorporating a new company, funneling all
assets out of the joint venture and into that new company,
and excluding Morley from ownership in and control of
that company.90
McKelvey and Dorsey sought summary judgment on Morley’s
joint venture claim, arguing that Morley could not “overcome
the steep standard of proof required to establish [the] claim.”91
This argument required the court to determine which burden
of proof standard is required “to establish a joint venture”; i.e.,
“a preponderance of the evidence standard” or “a clear and
convincing evidence standard.” The court acknowledged that
Missouri law was confusing on the issue, but that the

(1) the circumstances of Morley’s invitation to be part of
the enterprise; (2) the transformative nature of Morley’s
. . . contribution; (3) the lack of a consulting agreement
[with Morley] in light of the fact that other “consultants”
had such agreements; . . . ([4]) verbal and written
representations by the parties and others; and ([5]) [the
defendants’] inal negotiations with Morley.96
Defendants, on the other hand, argue[d] that [a joint
venture did not exist because] Morley did not share in
the company’s proits or risk of losses, had no voice in
management or role in the direction of the company,
had no role in employment decisions, had no ability to
enter contracts for the company, was not held out as a
partner [to third-parties, and was willing to] accept[] a
mere 1% . . . stake in the company.”97
The court considered the parties’ arguments and explained
that “when one party contributes the capital and the other the
labor, skill or experience for carrying on a joint enterprise, such a
combination constitutes a partnership unless something appears
to indicate the absence of a joint ownership of the business and
proits.”98 Further, the court explained that, pursuant to Missouri
law, “‘there need not necessarily be an agreement to share losses”
in order to ind an implied partnership.”99 The court ultimately
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgement, inding that
it was
clear to this Court that McKelvey and Dorsey intended
to work with Morley to build a business in the mobile
payments industry. Whether or not that intention rose to
the level of a joint venture or partnership appears to this
Court to be a question for the jury.100
An important factor for the court was that Morley’s idea
in using a cell phone to read a credit card’s magnetic strip (as
opposed to defendants’ original idea of using the phone camera to
capture credit card numbers) was transformative because it changed
the entire direction of defendants’ thinking and business plan:
Plaintif asks how defendants could pursue an entire
business on that idea, in collaboration with Morley, and
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not believe that such a pursuit and collaboration was
signiicant, probative evidence of whether or not the
parties intended to carry on as co-owners. This Court
agrees.
Morley had not suggested a mere logo or a company
name – his idea and prototype shaped the company
itself.101
The court rejected defendants’ argument that the court’s
denial of their motion for summary judgment would “open the
loodgates to partnership claims by every entry level startup
employee.”102 The court explained:
[D]efendants once again downplay the importance
of Morley’s contribution and role within the business.
Considering the totality of the circumstances –
the parties’ preexisting relationships, McKelvey’s
invitation to “play” and earlier communications about
entrepreneurial activity with Morley, the transformative
nature of Morley’s idea and his work in bringing that
idea to life, Morley’s continued role within the business
and his work to patent the card reader (paid for by
McKelvey), the promise of a “stock deal,” just to name
a few – there is at least a question of fact as to whether
the parties intended to carry on this business as coowners.103
The court went on to deny defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as it related to plaintif Morley’s fraud-based claims.
Morley contended – and the court agreed – that when the
evidence was presented to the jury, “the same facts that support
Morley’s joint venture claim could alternatively lead the jury to
a slightly diferent conclusion: that is, although defendants may
not have intended to start a business as co-owners with Morley,
they did intend to defraud him in order to obtain, without
compensation, his contributions.”104
Morley is an important case for business attorneys to be familiar
with, as it provides an example of individuals coming together
to perform business without drawing clear lines as to what their
relationship will consist of, resulting in a ight over a joint venture
claim. Morley also demonstrates that in the event a plaintif is
wrong that a partnership or joint venture existed between the
parties, the plaintif may still have a viable fraud claim on which
he can recover.
Who Can Be Held Liable for Breach of Contract?
A person can be held liable for breaches of a corporate
agreement if that person signed the agreement in their individual capacity.
This is distinguishable from a situation in which a person signs in
a representative capacity, such as on behalf of an entity or trust. In
that situation, the person will not be held liable in his individual
capacity.
In Gryphon Investments III, LLC ex rel. Schenk v. Wehrle,105 for
example, the court dismissed a breach of contract claim where
the plaintif sought to hold a defendant individually liable based
on the defendant’s signature on the operating agreement in his
capacity as a trustee. The court stated: “Gryphon III alleges that
Wehrle’s actions of diverting funds from Gryphon III breached
the Operating Agreement. However, Wehrle is not a party to the
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Operating Agreement. He signed that document in his capacity
as the trustee of the John S. Wehrle Revocable Living Trust.”106
As such, Wehrle could not be held liable in his individual
capacity for breach of the operating agreement.
This standard similarly applies to arbitration provisions
in operating agreements.107 In Springield Iron & Metal, LLC v.
Westfall, the Missouri Court of Appeals – Southern District
considered whether individuals who sign an operating agreement
in their representative capacities could enforce an arbitration
provision located in the operating agreement for claims they
bring individually. The company at issue – Springield Iron &
Metal, LLC – had two members: Westfall (an individual) and
Griesedieck Brothers (an LLC with two owners – Paul and
Chris). Westfall signed Springield Iron & Metal, LLC’s operating
agreement in his individual capacity.108 Paul and Chris signed the
operating agreement in their representative capacities as members
of Griesedieck Brothers, LLC.109 During an ensuing lawsuit
between the parties in which Paul, Chris, and Springield Iron &
Metal brought claims against Westfall, Paul and Chris moved to
compel arbitration on all claims based on Springield’s operating
agreement.110
Westfall contended that only the agreement’s signers were
subject to arbitration.111 Paul and Chris irst argued that they
were “‘entitled to the beneit of arbitration’ because [they] each
had a ‘close relationship’ with [Griesedieck Brothers, LLC (which
signed the operating agreement)] and non-arbitration of their
claims ‘would eviscerate’ [Springield’s] operating agreement.”112
The court disagreed, holding that “[t]o compel arbitration of
non-signatory claims – even those ‘inextricably intertwined’
with signatory claims – ‘is inconsistent with the overarching rule
that arbitration is ultimately a matter of agreement between the
parties.’”113
The court further rejected the argument that, as the agents
for Griesedieck Brothers, LLC, Paul and Chris share the LLC’s
“power to compel arbitration under the operating agreement[:]”
The agreement does not name the Griesediecks as
parties or treat them as such, nor did they sign it as
individuals, but only as members of [Griesedieck
Brothers, LLC]. By signing only as agents in a
representative capacity, the Griesediecks are not bound
by or to the agreement as individuals…. It is the
principal that can be bound by the signature of the
agent, not the agent that can be bound by the signature
of the principal.114
The court similarly found unconvincing Paul’s and Chris’s
argument that it was “‘only logical’ and eicient for everyone to
arbitrate” all claims together and that “inconsistency [may arise]
if some claims are arbitrated while others are not.”115 The court
held that the Supreme Court of Missouri “deems arbitration
a matter of agreement, even if arbitrated and non-arbitrated
issues are ‘inextricably intertwined.’”116 “We are not free to
erode arbitration’s voluntary nature for the sake of judicial
convenience.”117
Business Contracts – Unlimited Power?
While parties have broad discretion to enter into contractual
agreements to govern their business relationships, such discretion
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is not unlimited. For example, business owners may not enter
into agreements that violate state or federal laws. This was
demonstrated in Grillo v. Global Patent Group LLC,118 in which
the Missouri Court of Appeals – Eastern District held that a
nonlawyer oicer manager’s alleged agreement with a lawyer
to share in the proits of the lawyer’s irm was unenforceable,
as it violated a Missouri statute prohibiting the splitting of
compensation with nonlawyers.
Additionally, minority shareholders, members, and partners
may have claims against majority shareholders, managers, or
controlling partners if the corporate agreements between the
parties are breached, applied oppressively, or applied in ways
that breach the defendants’ iduciary duties.11
Conclusion
Attorneys representing business clients must be familiar with
the types of agreements and provisions that can be useful, or
should be avoided, in business entities. What type of entity
and what type of agreement best suits the client? Should the
agreement include exit ramps, with buyout formulas, in the event
of disability or death? What iduciary duties should be explicitly
discussed in the agreement? Attorneys well-versed in the
statutory provisions related to partnerships, LLCs, corporations,
and joint ventures, along with the applicable case law, will be
best able to assist their business clients. Absent clear agreements,
the parties’ rights when things go wrong will then often depend
on case law dealing with iduciary duties and shareholder and
member oppression.
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Writing it Right
Continued from page 27

Because courts call counsel’s hope for dramatic courtroom
surprise “pure fantasy”68 and a “prayer,”69 appellate courts citing
the ictional Mason normally airm the trial court’s exercise of
discretion to exclude a witness or to limit cross-examination.
In United States v. Beck,70 for example, the convicted defendant
contended that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by
limiting his counsel’s questioning of a hostile witness. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit found harmless error.71 “It
is unlikely that counsel expected [the witness] to break down on
the stand and admit that his perjury was part of an elaborate
scheme to frame the defendants. Only Perry Mason enjoyed such
moments.”72
Courts also cite Perry Mason to reject claims that the assigned
counsel’s assertedly inefective assistance denied the defendant
a fair trial. One federal district court explained that “the
Constitution guarantees only representation which is reasonably
competent, not the perfection which exists only in iction.”73
In yet another case, a dissenting judge observed that on
inefectiveness claims, courts “compare counsel’s performance
not to an ideal, Perry Mason-style defense . . . but to what a
reasonably competent counsel could accomplish under the
circumstances of the case.”74 In 2015, however, the Tennessee
Supreme Court provided this advice: “[A] lawyer who represents
criminal clients may be interested in watching Perry Mason . . .
on television, and may even pick up a useful tidbit or two from
doing so.”75
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has invoked
defense counsel Mason to discuss prosecutors’ professional
responsibilities: “[T]he prosecutor’s aim is justice. . . . [W]hen
it becomes apparent during the trial of a criminal case, a la the
celebrated ictional career of Perry Mason, that the accused
50
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is innocent of the crime with which he stands charged, the
prosecutor has not ‘lost.’”76
L.A. Law
Among television dramas about lawyers and law enforcement,
the runner-up to Perry Mason for the number of citations in
federal and state court opinions is undoubtedly L.A. Law,
which has also led courts to distinguish iction from reality.
Commentators suspected that during its run from 1986 to
1994, the show’s ictional portrayal of law practice not only left
Americans with unrealistic visions about what lawyers do, but
also encouraged many applicants to pursue law school based on
unrealistic visions of careers in the fast lane.77
Law school applications rose as L.A. Law presented the
practice, according to one writer, as “a lifestyle package that
involved clothes, friends, relationships, social status and that
elusive ingredient: getting paid for championing social justice
causes. . . . There was never a dull client, never a boring case
and in court they were poised and articulate.”78 After the show
left the air, law school application numbers fell nationwide.79
Decisions accenting L.A. Law’s unrealistic visions include United
States v. Prince,80 which airmed the defendant’s convictions for
bank robbery and unlawfully using a irearm during commission
of a violent crime.81 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit began Prince with words of caution: “[T]he would-be
lawyer raised on the hit television series, L.A. Law, to believe
a law degree is that golden ticket to a glamorous career of big
money, fast cars and intimate relationships among the beautiful
people may think twice before sending in his or her law school
application when word of this case gets out.”82
After the trial court twice denied the assigned federal public
defender’s requests to withdraw from the case because defendant
Prince refused to talk to him, the defendant dropped his pants
and urinated in front of the jury as the panel was being sworn.83
A court-ordered psychological examination found the defendant
mobar.org

competent to stand trial, and the court of appeals held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order a
second examination.84
“[F]or the one-time budding lawyer whose hopes for a
dazzling life have now been dashed by the facts of this case,” the
Prince panel suggested “an alternative career in screenwriting.”85
The panel concluded that “[u]nusual stories like this one are
apparently standard fare for the ictional television lawyers of
L.A. Law, who face many obstacles before cashing their paycheck
and speeding of to another intimate dinner-party.”86
Other Television Dramas About Lawyers and Law Enforcement
In addition to Perry Mason and L.A. Law, courts have discussed
other television shows about lawyers and law enforcement.
In State v. Taylor, for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court committed no error when it
permitted the prosecutor to question prospective jurors about
their willingness to convict the defendant on eyewitness testimony
alone.87 The panel explained that “[g]iven the prevalence of
television shows such as CSI and Law and Order, a trend exists
wherein juries expect the State to present physical evidence on
every issue. The trial court does not err in allowing the State to
ferret out such juror biases during voir dire.”88
When the convicted defendant asserted his lack of knowledge
about the underlying crime because a witness at trial never
referred to stolen tractors as “hot” or “stolen,” the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 6th Circuit concluded that the witness’
characterizations “mean[t] nothing” because “[d]iscreet thieves
often sell obviously stolen properly without using the lingo of the
stereotypical ‘Law & Order’ or ‘N.Y.P.D. Blue’ villain.”89
In Clingman v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected
the convicted defendant’s contention that the prosecutor had
improperly commented to the court about facts that did not
concern the crimes to which the defendant had pleaded.90
Finding that the prosecutor’s comments approached impropriety,
two concurring justices cited Hill Street Blues (which aired from
1981 to 1987) and repeated the advice of the show’s morning
roll-call police sergeant, who would end his daily brieing with,
“Let’s be careful out there.”91
Courts frustrated with written or oral verbosity, name calling,
or extraneous argument sometimes issue opinions that relay the
classic no-nonsense instruction from Los Angeles police Sgt.
Joe Friday (played by Jack Webb) on Dragnet, a drama series
that “redeined the image of law enforcement in the culture at
large”92 while it aired from 1951 to 1959: “Just the facts, m’am,
just the facts.”93
In Privitera v. City of Phelps, the appellate court airmed
dismissal of a slander claim against the defendant who had
charged the plaintif with membership in the Maia.94 The
panel dispensed with lengthy explanation about potential harm
to the plaintif’s reputation because (as a concurring justice
stated) “[t]hose unaware of the criminal ventures of Al Capone
have now been educated by the long-running TV series ‘The
Untouchables,’ based on his life.”95
Judicial opinions have discussed one foreign television
show about lawyers. Rumpole of the Bailey aired on the British
Broadcasting Company (BBC), and on the Public Broadcasting
System (PBS) in the United States. Deftly combining drama and
comedy, the series concerned a ictional London barrister who

usually represented criminal defendants in The Old Bailey, a
court building in central London.96 Horace Rumpole, played by
Leo McKern, often referred to his sometimes overbearing wife,
Hilda, as “she who must be obeyed.”97 Courts in the United
States have quoted barrister Rumpole by name to illustrate
why administrative agency regulations must be obeyed,98 why
lower courts must apply (and hence “obey”) mandates from
higher courts,99 and why persons must heed (and hence “obey”)
contractual obligations.100
Television Dramas Unrelated to Lawyers and Law Enforcement
Federal and state judicial opinions have also cited television
dramas that treat legal topics only sporadically, if at all. In Mason
v. Smithkline Beecham Corp, for example, the plaintifs – the parents
of a 23-year-old woman who committed suicide two days after
taking Paxil, an anti-depressant drug similar to Prozac – alleged
negligence by the defendant manufacturer for not warning that
taking Paxil increased the risk of suicide.101 The 7th Circuit
described Prozac this way: “Anyone who has ever watched The
Sopranos knows that it’s the drug Dr. Jennifer Meli prescribed
for Tony Soprano after telling him ‘no one needs to sufer from
depression with the wonders of modern pharmacology.’”102
Some judges have cited Marcus Welby, M.D. (played by Robert
Young in a drama that aired from 1969 to 1976) as the model
family practice physician. The ictional physician, who was
known for his house calls and soothing bedside manner, helped
one judge discuss whether the defendant physician’s demeanor
toward an allegedly demanding patient fell short in a medical
malpractice action.103 Visions of Dr. Welby also helped another
court explain that jurors weighing expert testimony tended to
give more weight to physician witnesses than to psychologists
because of “‘the Marcus Welby Efect’ from the 1970’s television
series of the same name.”104
Rod Serling’s science iction drama, The Twilight Zone (which
aired from 1959 to 1964) helped popularize the term that
describes the often murky “gray area” between two extremes.105
In Larsen v. State Employees Retirement System, a former state supreme
court judge alleged that state agencies had improperly calculated
his retirement beneits.106 Citing the television series, the federal
district court determined that the action “lies somewhere in the
twilight zone of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.”107
To illuminate procedural and substantive points, courts have
cited characters and themes from a host of other television
dramas, including Star Trek,108 The Outer Limits,109 The Lone
Ranger,110 The Adventures of Superman,111 Branded,112 Dallas,113 The Six
Million Dollar Man,114 The Bionic Woman,115 Hopalong Cassidy,116 Roy
Rogers,117 and The Millionaire.118
Next issue: References to TV situation comedies and
reality shows.
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2000) (discussing “the type of concealment and sharp practices that would make
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the 1970s ‘bionic’ limbs and body parts were addressed in the ictional television
series ‘The Six Million Dollar Man’ and ‘The Bionic Woman.’ . . . Given the
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nothing about one’s state of mind years later. If it did, every child who ever
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Randle v. Sanders, 2016 WL 7321298 *1 & n. 1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2016) (“As
ictional cowboy hero Hopalong Cassidy suggests, agreements made the ‘cowboy
way’ are held to a higher standard.”).
117 Lewis, supra note 116.
118 Val-Pak of Cent. Conn. N., Inc. v. Comm’r Rev. Servs., 670 A.2d 343 (Conn.
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Supreme Court Rule Changes

The Supreme Court of Missouri, in an order dated December
18, 2018, repealed the heading title of subdivision 6.01, entitled
“Annual Enrollment Fee and Statement – Exemptions – Penalties
– Pro Hac Vice Fee,” of Rule 6, entitled “Fees to Practice Law,”
and adopted a new title of subdivision 6.01, entitled “Annual
Enrollment Fee and Statement – Exemptions – Penalties – Pro
Hac Vice Fee – Pro Bono Waiver.”
In the same order, the Court adopted a new subdivision
6.01(o), entitled “Pro Bono Waiver of Annual Enrollment Fee,” of
subdivision 6.01, entitled Annual Enrollment Fee and Statement
– Exemptions – Penalties – Pro HacVice Fee – Pro Bono Waiver,”
of Rule 6, entitled “Fees to Practice Law.”
The Court also adopted a new Pilot Project for Pro Bono Waiver
Under Adopted Rule 6.01(o).
The efective date of the Adopted Rule is January 1, 2020.
The efective date of the Pilot Project is January 1, 2019.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.

Continued from page 30

Court); subdivision 33.10 (Misdemeanors or Felonies –
Transmittal of Record by Clerk of the Releasing Court); and
subdivision 33.11 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Bonds – Where
Filed – Certiication by Sherif or Peace Oicer – Cash Bonds)
of Rule 33, entitled “Misdemeanors or Felonies – Release
Pending Further Proceedings,” and in lieu thereof adopted a
new subdivision 33.01 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Right to
Release – Conditions); a new heading title and new subdivision
33.02 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Warrant for Arrest –
Conditions to be Stated on Warrant); a new subdivision 33.04
(Misdemeanors or Felonies – Oicer Authorized to Accept
Conditions of Release); a new heading title and new subdivision
33.05 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Release Hearing); a new
subdivision 33.06 (Misdemeanors or Felonies – Modiication of
Conditions of Release; a new subdivision 33.07 (Misdemeanors
or Felonies – Rules of Evidence Inapplicable); a new heading
title and new subdivision 33.08 (Misdemeanors or Felonies –
Rearrest of Defendant); a new subdivision 33.09 (Misdemeanors
or Felonies – Failure of Court to Set Conditions or Setting of
Inadequate or Excessive Conditions for Release – Application
to Higher Court); a new subdivision 33.10 (Misdemeanors or
Felonies – Transmittal of Record by Clerk of the Releasing
Court); and a new subdivision 33.11 (Misdemeanors or Felonies
– Bonds – Where Filed – Certiication by Sherif or Peace Oicer
– Cash Bonds).
This order becomes efective July 1, 2019.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.
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In an order dated December 18, 2018, the Supreme Court
of Missouri repealed subdivision 5.21(e), entitled “Interim
Suspension and Final Discipline for Criminal Activities,” of Rule
5, entitled “Complaints and Proceedings Thereon,” and adopted
a new subdivision 5.21(e), entitled “Interim Suspension and Final
Discipline for Criminal Activities.”
This order becomes efective January 1, 2019.
The complete text of the order may be read in its entirety at
www.courts.mo.gov.
CORRECTION – In the November/December 2018 issue of
the Journal of The Missouri Bar, the efective date of the order of
October 15, 2018 concerning Rules 56 and 58 is July 1, 2019. It
was erroneously listed at January 1, 2019.
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